Privitizing Social Security: Administration and Implementation by Burke, Karen C. & McCouch, Grayson M.P.
University of Florida Levin College of Law
UF Law Scholarship Repository
UF Law Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
Fall 2001
Privitizing Social Security: Administration and
Implementation
Karen C. Burke
University of Florida Levin College of Law, burkek@law.ufl.edu
Grayson M.P. McCouch
University of Florida Levin College of Law, gmccouch@law.ufl.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub
Part of the Retirement Security Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in UF Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
outler@law.ufl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Privitizing Social Security: Administration and Implementation, 58 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1325
(2001), available at http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub/555
Privatizing Social Security:
Administration and Implementation
Karen C. Burke*
Grayson M.P. McCouch*
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ...................................... 1325
HI. Administrative Issues ............................. 1328
A. Collection and Recordkeeping ..................... 1329
B. Investment Options: Risks, Returns, and Regulation .... 1331
1. Investment Options .......................... 1331
2. Regulatory Response ........................ 1336
3. Investment Risk ............................ 1339
4. Political Risk .............................. 1343
C. Annm tizati.on. ................................. 1346
Il. Conclusion ...................................... 1351
L Introduction
The existing social security program provides retirement income security
for the vast majority of American workers and their families. Social Security
functions as a large-scale defined benefit system that is administered by the
federal government and financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. The government
collects contributions in the form of a flat-rate payroll tax on the wages of
current workers and pays benefits to retired or disabled workers and eligible
family members based on a statutory formula reflecting each worker's lifetime
earnings history.' Although the system currently generates a modest annual
* Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law.
** Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. The authors would like
to thank the University of San Diego School of Law for generous research support.
1. In general, "Social Security" refers to the Federal Old-Ago, Survivors, Disablity, and
Hospital Insurance Program. For an overview of the program, see generally STAFF OF HousE
COMM. ON WAYS AND MiFANS, 106TH CONG.,BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ONPRO-
GRAMSWIHNTEJURISDICIONOFTHECOMTEEONWAYANDMEANS 1-96 (Comm. Print
2000).
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surplus, the long-term outlook is less encouraging. Official projections indi-
cate that around 2037, while baby boomers are still drawing retirement bene-
fits, the system will no longer be able to pay promised benefits in full.2 Re-
storing fiscal balance to the Social Security system clearly will require reform
of some sort, but both the direction and the scope of reform are highly contro-
versial.
Proposals for privatizing at least part of the Social Security system play
an increasingly prominent role in the debate over reform? Broadly speaking,
privatization refers to a shift toward a defined contribution system in which
each worker sets aside funds in a personal retirement account over the course
of his or her working life and controls the investment of funds in the account.4
Thus, in a privatized system, the level of retirement benefits for each partici-
pant depends on the accumulated balance in his or her account at the time of
retirement. Proponents point out that privatization would give individual
participants an enhanced sense of ownership and control over their retirement
savings, as well as opportunities to achieve higher investment returns from
access to private capital markets.5 Furthermore, proponents contend that
2. See BD. OF TRUSTEES,FEDERALOWD-AGEAND SURVIVORS SURANCE ANDDISABIL-
rrT INSURANCE TRUST FUNDs, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2000). See generally Michael J.
Boskin, A Framework for Considering Social Security Reform, in FRAMING THE SOCIAL
SECURiTY DEBATE: VALUES,PoLTiCs, AND ECONOMICS 29,37 (R. Douglas Arnold et al. eds.,
1998) [hereinafter FRAMING THE SOCIAL SECURIIY DEBATE] (noting that, even in absence of
long-run actuarial problems, it might be useful to consider "nontrivial changes" in current tax
and benefit structure).
3. See generally GEN. ACCOUNING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURiTY: EVALUATING REFORM
PROPOSALS (GAO/AIMDIHEHS-00-29), REPORT TO CONG. REQUESTERS (1999) (providing
overview of current reform proposals). A majority ofthe members of the 1994-1996 Advisory
Council on Social Security supported some form of personal accounts but offered divergent
proposals for the structure and implementation of such accounts. See I REPORT OF THE 1994-
1996 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURrTy 28 (1997) [hereinafter ADvisoRy COUNCIL
REPORT] (proposing "individual account" (IA) plan for government-administered accounts with
constrained investment options); id. at 30 (proposing "personal security account" (PSA) plan
for decentralized accounts with broad investment options).
4. See Martin Feldstein, Introduction, in PRiVATIZING SOCIAL SEcURiY 1, 2 (Martin
Feldstein ed., 1998) (defining "essence" of privatization as giving individuals "control over their
own investments"). The shift from a defined benefit to a defined contribution system also has
far-reaching implications for the overall allocation of risk both within and across generations.
See Peter A Diamond, The Economics of Social Security Reform, in FRAMING THE SOCIAL
SECURITY DEBATE, supra note 2, at 38, 44 (noting that "[w]ith a defined-benefit system, the
risks can be spread more widely, with the economic advantages-that come from wider pooling
ofrisks").
5. See ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 3, at 104-05 (noting that PSA plan
would "give workers real ownership claims over the contributions" and criticizing existing
Social Security system as providing "a rate of return ... much lower than the real return to
private capital").
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higher investment returns could ease the transition from the existing pay-as-
you-go system to an advance-funded system of personal accounts and could
eventually produce long-term economic gains."
While most privatization proposals link personal accounts with advance
funding and investment diversification, these features are analytically dis-
tinct. It is possible, at least in theory, to achieve higher investment returns
through advance funding and diversified investment in a centralized, govern-
mert-administered system without introducing personal accounts Once
projected investment returns are adjusted for market risk and the transition
costs of advance funding are taken into account,9 however, projected increases
inthe aggregate rate of return may turn out to be much less dramatic than they
initially appear.10 Moreover, privatization proposals involve serious tradeoffs
and conflicts both within and across generations of workers, which ultimately
must be resolved through the political process.
6. See Feldstein, supra note 4, at 16-17 (noting potential gains from privatization);
Martin Feldstein & Andrew Samwick, The Transiion Path in Privatizing Social Security, in
PRIVATZ NG SOCIAL SEcuRrry 215, 218-21 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1998) (arguing that fully
privatized system with personal accounts could be funded by payroll tax of around two percent,
based on assumption that accounts would receive estimated nine percent pretax rate of return
after rebate of corporate tax); cf Randall P. Mariger, Social SecurityPrivatization: WhatAre
the Issues?, 52 NAT'L TAX J. 783,783 (1999) (arguing that "free lunch arguments for privatiza-
tion are false").
7. See John Geanakoplos et al., WouldaPrivatizedSocialSecuritySystemReallyPay a
HigherRate ofReturn?, in FRAMING THE SOCIAL SECURlY DEBATE, supra note 2, at 1338-41.
8. In thcory, higher returns also could be achieved through partial advance funding ofthe
existing defined benefit system, coupled -with centralized investment of a portion of social
security trust funds in private capital markets. See ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 3,
at 25-27 (proposing incremental changes in existing system, including investment of trust funds
in stock market, under "maintain benefits" (MB) plan); infra notes 94 & 100-02 and accompany-
ing text (discussing centralized, government-administered trust fund). The economic benefit of
such a stock-for-debt swap would be most significant for constrained individuals who currently
do not participate in diversified capital markets. See Geanakoplos ct al., supra note 7, at 138,
152-54; cf Feldstein & Samwick, supra note 6, at 217 (noting that "while the funds could in
principle be collected and invested by the government, we believe that there are many reasons
for preferring a decentralized system"). See generallyPierre Pestieau & Uri U. Possen, Invesing
SocialSecuritv in the EquityMarket: Does it Make a Difference?, 53 NAT'L TAX J. 41 (2000).
9. In effect, implementing advance funding would require that current workers pay
twice - once to pay benefits already promised to current retirees under the existing system and
once to finance their own personal accounts. By one recent estimate, the transition cost
amounts to an unfunded liability of around $9 trillion, representing the difference between bene-
fits already paid out or promised under the existing system and contributions paid into the sys-
tem to date. See Stephen C. Goss, Measuring Solvency in the Social Security System, in
PROSPECTS FOR SOCIAL SECUITYREFORM 16,34 (Olivia S. Mitchell et al. eds., 1999).
10. See Geanakoplos et al., supra note 7, at 148-57.
11. See generally BARRY BosWORTH & GARY BURTUESS, THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL SE-
cuRrrY REFoRm ON SAVING, INVESTMENT, AND TBE L1vEL AND DImSTmmBUiON OF WORKER
WEL,-BMNG (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Boston Coll., Working Paper, 2000) (arguing that
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The purpose of this Article is not to argue the case for or against privat-
ization or to evaluate the merits of specific reform proposals. 2 Instead, we
consider administrative issues that bear on the structure and implementation
of any universal, mandatory system of personal accounts. In general, the
central issues in designing personal accounts involve tradeoffs between rela-
tively standardized, low-cost options with constrained individual choice and
limited risk on the one hand and more flexible, higher-cost options with
enhanced opportunities for individual control and greater risk on the other
hand. 3 Moreover, the range of available investment and payout options may
have a direct impact on the nature and degree of government involvement.
To a large extent, the structure of a system of personal accounts depends on
decisions concerning acceptable levels of cost, risk, and control for individual
participants. 4 Although administrative issues only recently have begun to
attract widespread attention, they are crucial in evaluating the practical feasi-
bility of a system of personal accounts.
I. Administrative Issues
Establishing and administering personal accounts for all workers covered
by Social Security presents formidable challenges that no existing system is
fully equipped to meet.'" Any system of personal accounts must perform the
following three basic functions: collecting contributions and maintaining
replacing all or part of existing defined benefit system with defined contribution system may
increase national savings, capital stock, and wages over lengthy time horizon, while reducing
workers' or retirees' consumption in short run); Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch,
Perspectives on Social Security Reform, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 417 (1999) (discussing proposals for
Social Security reform).
12. Accordingly, we do not discuss the role of a privatized component as a "carve-out"
from or an "add-on" to the existing social security system, nor do we discuss alternative sources
of financing for a system of personal accounts (i.e., from increased taxes, additional government
debt, or revenue diverted from other uses). See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURrTY:
CAPITAL MARKETS AND EDUCATIONAL ISSUES ASSOCIATED wrrH INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS
(GAO/GGD-99-1 15), REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS 5-6
(1999) [hereinafter GAO, CArTAL MARKETS].
13. See GEN.ACCOUNTINGOFFICE, SOCIALSEURrTYREFORI& IMPLEMENTATIONISSUES
FORINDIVIDUALACCOUNTS (GAO/HEHS-99-122),REPORTTOTHECHARMANHOuSECOMM.
ON WAYS AND MANS 4 (1999) [hereinaftr GAO, ImpiEMENTAiION ISSUES].
14. SeeLAWRENEH. THOMPSON,ADMINISTERINGINDIVIDUALACCOUNTSINSOCIALSE-
Cirr: THERoLE oFVAuES AND OBjECTIVEsNSHAINGOFnoNs 18 (Urban Inst,Retirement
Project Occasional Paper No. 1, 1999) (noting that "variation among the [personal account]
plans can be traced to differences of opinion about the relative importance" of different goals).
15. SeeNAT'LACAD. OFSOC.INs.,REPORTOFTHEPANELONPRIVATIZATIONOF SOClAL
SECURITY: EvALUATINGISSUESINPRIVATIzINGSOCIALSECUR~rY29 (1998) [hereinafterPANEL
ON PRIVATIZATION] (noting that privatized system would require establishment of more than
140 million personal accounts; by comparison, no existing private firm administers more than
six million accounts).
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records, investing accumulated funds, and determining and paying benefits. In
the existing social security system, all ofthese functions are centralized in the
hands of the federal government. In a system with personal accounts, by con-
trast, it would be possible to shift some of these functions from the government
to individual participants orto financial intermediaries. Choices among differ-
ent methods of implementing personal accounts may have far-reaching conse-
quences for the long-term financial and political viability ofa privatized system.
A. Collection and Recordkeeping
The existing social security system provides a useful starting point for a
centralized, government-administered system of collecting contributions and
crediting them to personal accounts for individual participants. Under existing
law, an employer withholds payroll taxes from each employee's wages and
deposits those taxes (together with the employer's share) with the Internal
Revenue Service. 6 The Internal Revenue Service monitors the total amount
of payroll taxes collected but does not earmark amounts for individual employ-
ees." Similarly, althoughthe Social SecurityAdministrationmaintains records
of each individual employee's reported earnings, it does not match those
earnings with payroll taxes actually collected from the employer."8 Thus, the
government cannot identify payroll tax receipts attributable to a particular
employee until the employer submits its annual W-2 wage statements for each
employee.
19
Riding piggyback on the payroll and income tax system would avoid
wasteful duplication of existing collection and recordkeeping mechanisms.
Nevertheless, some modifications would be necessary to ensure timely credit-
ing of contributions to personal accounts."0 To mitigate the impact ofthe time
lag between collection and posting to personal accounts, payroll taxes re-
ceived from employers could temporarily be pooled in a relatively safe invest-
ment vehicle, such as a money market fund.21 Upon identifying the amount
of payroll tax collections attributable to each individual employee, the govern-
16. See id. at 30 (noting that 6.5 million employers report to Social Security Administra-
tion annually).
17. See Janice M. Gregory, Possible Employer Responses to Social Security Reform, in
PROSPECTS FOR SOCIAL SECURrFORM 313,323 (Olivia S. Mitchell et al. eds., 1999).
18. See id.
19. See GAO, IMPLEMEATIONISsUES, supra note 13, at 15.
20. Olivia S. Mitchell, Administrative Costs in Public and Private Retirement Systems,
in PRrVATIZING SOCIAL SECURirY 403, 417 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1998) (noting that existing
system "seems to be slow in tracking earnings and contributions"); see GAO, IMPLEMENTATION
ISSUe, supra note 13, at 17 (noting delay of seven to twenty-two months in posting earnings
to Social Security records).
21. See GAO, IMLEENTATION ISSUES, supra note 13, at 17 (discussing alternative
methods).
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ment could credit the appropriate amount, together with a ratable share of
investment earnings, by electronic transfer to the personal account designated
on the employee's income tax return.
Of course, the function of collecting contributions and crediting them
to personal accounts need not be centralized in the hands of the federal govern-
ment. In theory, employers could perform this fiction in much the same way
as under an existing 401(k) plan.' An employer-based approach, however,
would represent a substantial new administrative burden, especially for small-
and medium-size employers who presently do not offer 401(k) plans.24 There
is no reason to assume that employers would operate more reliably or effi-
ciently than the government in crediting contributions to personal accounts, nor
is it clear that they would be able or willingto assume this responsibility.25
An even more decentralized approach, modeled on existing individual
retirement accounts (IRAs), would rely on individual employees to deposit
funds directly into their personal accounts and to report contributions annually
on their federal income tax returns.26 An employee-based approach, however,
would involve high administrative costs and would raise potentially serious
compliance problems.21 Accordingly, there appears to be an emerging consen-
22. See id.; Fred T. Goldberg, Jr. & Michael J. Graetz, Reforming Social Security: A
Practical and Workable System ofPersonalRetirementAccounts, in ADMINITRATIVEASPECTS
OFINVEsTMmr-BASED SOCIALSEcuRrYREFORM9,16-17 (JohnB. Shoven ed., 2000) [here-
inafterADmDUSMATlVEASPE r ].
23. Under a401(k) plan or "cash or deferred arrangement" (CODA), employees may elect
to contribute a portion of their salary on a pre-tax basis to fund retirement savings. See I.R.C.
§ 401(k) (1994).
24. See PANEL ON PRIVAIZATiON, supra note 15, at 63 (noting that direct deposits by
employers would be burdensome for small firms). Although almost all workers are now covered
by social security, only around fifty percent of full-time workers in the private sector are
covered by any type of employer-provided retirement plan, and around twenty-five million
individuals participate in 401(k) plans. See GAO, IMP.EMENTATION ISSUES, supra note 13, at
18. Furthermore, 401(k) plans are disproportionately concentrated among large employers and
are "almost nonexistent at small firms." Robert C. Pozen & John M. Kimpel, Investment and
Administrative Constraints on Individual Social SecurityAccounts, in PROSPECTS FOR SOCIAL
SECUR1ry REFoRM, supra note 17, at 377.
25. See ERISA INDUS. COM., THE VITAL CONNECTION: ANANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT
OF SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM ON EMPLOYER-SPONSORED RETIREMENT PLANS 58 (1998) (de-
scribing 401(k) approach as potentially "costly, cumbersome, and counterproductive"); GAO,
IMP.EMENTATION ISSUES, supra note 13, at 18 (noting that "most employers oppose any addi-
tional paperwork burden or costs").
26. Cf. LR.C. § 408 (1994) (authorizing IRAs). In 1992, around 9.6 million individuals
made IRA contributions. See GAO, IMPM ATION ISSUES, supra note 13, at 20.
27. See GAO, IPLEMENTATION ISSUES, supra note 13, at 20 (noting that "[o]versee-
ing the large number of accounts, ensuring compliance, and preventing fraud would be signifi-
cant issues to consider under [an employee-based] model"); Pozen & Kimpel, supra note 24,
at 377.
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sus that "it would be administratively simpler and less costly for the gov-
ernment to send funds directly to fund managers to credit to individual ac-
counts."
28
B. Investment Options: Risks, Returns, and Regulation
A system of personal accounts would channel an unprecedented surge of
funds into capital markets, and the responsibility for managing these funds
would almost certainly fall into the hands of brokers or other financial inter-
mediaries. While the aggregate volume of funds and the number of personal
accounts would be very large,21 most accounts would be relatively small. In
1997, around two-thirds of all workers earned less than $30,000. Assuming
annual contributions equal two percent of earnings, the amount credited to
these workers' personal accounts for 1997 would have been $600 or less. In
defining the range of investment options available to individual participants,
it is important to keep in mind the goal of providing retirement security for all
participants.
1. Investment Options
A fundamental issue is how much choice participants should have in
directing the investment of funds in their personal accounts. A system of per-
sonal accounts could offer participants virtually unlimited freedom to choose
investment strategies ranging from relatively safe, low-risk portfolios (e.g.,
money market funds) to those that are high-risk and aggressive (e.g., venture
capital or global equity funds). Participants would be able to tailor investment
strategies to suit their own preferences for risk and return and might also
enjoy an enhanced sense of autonomy and control in planning for retirement.
At the same time, a system with a broad range of investment options would
be relatively costly to administer and might leave many participants with
28. MARTIN FEIDSTEIN & ANDREW SAMWICK, MAINTAINING SoCAL cuy BEE-
FITM AND TAX RATES T ROUGHPERSONALRETIREMENTACCOUNTS: AN UPDATE BASED ON
THE 1998 SoCIAL SECURnY TRUSTEES REPORT 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 6540,1999); see also Mitchell, supra note 20, at 421 (noting that system is likely to
be more efficient if "revenue collection and record-keeping functions are handled by a single
agency").
29. See GAO, CAPITALMARKETS, supra note 12, at22 (noting that two percent of payroll
-was around $70 billion in 1998 and could rise to around $220 billion by 2020).
30. See GEN.ACCOUNTNGOIcE, SOciALSECunYREFOP ADmINIsTRATV COsTS
FORINDVfDUALAcCOUNTsDEPENDONSYTEMDEsGN(GAO/HEHS-99-131),REPORTTOTHE
RANKING MINoRriY MEMBER, HouSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANs 25 (1999) [hereinafler
GAO, ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS]; see also GAO, IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES, supra note 13, at 35
(noting that in 1997, average taxable earnings were $22,383, and at two percent rate, average
contribution would have been around $448).
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inadequate sources of retirement income. Accordingly, some constraints on
individual choice maybe desirable in order to control administrative costs and
to promote retirement policy goals.
Administrative costs can significantly erode the value of an account over
time. For example, an annual fee equal to one percent of asset value could
reduce the accumulated balance in an account by over twenty percent over the
course of a forty-year career."' The level of administrative costs varies with
the range of investment options and the level of services provided. 2 An
actively managed portfolio with full services of the sort offered by many
mutual funds might well incur annual administrative costs of over one percent
of asset value, while comparable costs for a passively managed index fund
with fewer services might be less than one-third of one percent.3 Thus, one
way to control administrative costs would be to offer a narrow choice of
investment vehicles with limited services, though such an approach might fail
to satisfy participants familiar with high-end products and services available
on the open market.' Furthermore, it is not clear that the increased adminis-
trative costs associated with actively managed accounts would be offset by
higher investment returns.35
31. See Diamond, supra note 4, at 54.
32. See GAO, ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS, supra note 30, at 26 (noting that "[i]ndividual
account structures with lower administrative costs are often associated with more restricted
investment choices and more centralized management, while increasing individual choice and
decentralizing the management structure could result in increased costs").
33. See Mitchell, supra note 20, at 427-29; see also GAO, ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS, supra
note 30, at 3, 14-15 (estimating annual administrative costs ranging from around 0.1% for
centralized system with limited investment choices and services to 2% or 3% for decentralized
system with more extensive investment choices and services); Estelle James et al., Mutual
Funds and Institutional Investments: What Is the Most Efficient Way to Set Up Individual
Accounts in a Social Security System?, in ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS, supra note 22, at 120
(estimating that asset management costs in system of "constrained choice" could be kept at or
below 0.65% of asset value); Sylvester J. Schieber & John B. Shoven, Administering a Cost-
Effective National Program ofPersonalSecurityAccountr, inADMNISTRATIVEASPECTS, supra
note 22, at 56 tbL 2A (showing total administrative fees charged by selected large mutual fund
companies in 1998 ranging from 0.19% to 0.77% of asset value).
34. See Peter Diamond, Administrative Costs and Equilibrium Charges with Individual
Accounts, in ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS, supra note 22, at 146 (noting that "a critical question
is what level of services would be a political equilibrium").
35. See GAO, ADMINISTRATIVNE COSTS, supra note 30, at 24 (notingthat"[m]any actively
managed investment options have not been able to generate higher returns than broad market
indexes"); James et al., supra note 33, at 111 (noting that "[i]f higher costs led to higher returns,
they would be worth incurring. However, a large literature indicates that this is not the
case .. . ."); see also Estelle James et aL, Administrative Costs and the Organization oflndiv-
idualAccount Systems: A ComparativePerspective, inNEWIDE ABOUT OIDA(E SECuRflY:
TOWARD SUSTAINABLE PENSION SYSTEMS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 254,297 (Robert Holzmann
& Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2001) [hereinafter NEW IDEAS ABOUT OLD AGE SECURITY] (noting
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High administrative costs would be especially burdensome for small
accounts. For a worker who earns an average wage and retires at the normal
retirement age after a full career, the accumulated balance in a personal
account is likely to be relatively modest.3 6 One way to mitigate this problem
would be to calculate administrative costs for all accounts based on a uniform
percentage of assef value, thereby cross-subsidizing small accounts." Alter-
natively, it might be possible to impose a cap on administrative costs, though
enforcement of such a cap might prove difficult.s
As an example of a low-cost, "no-frills" retirement plan, consider the
Thrift Savings Plan (TSP), a defined contribution plan for federal employees.39
The TSP is administered by the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board,
an independent federal agency. Contributions are collected through payroll
deductions and held in trust for participants. Individual participants allocate
their contributions within a limited range of passive index funds that are
managed by private investment managers selected in a competitive bidding
process. 0
The TSP demonstrates that a retirement system with personal accounts
can achieve substantial diversification at a low administrative cost.4 Some
that constraints on investment choices are predicated on assumption "that the judgement of
many workers about the relationship between fund performance and fees is imperfect, and that
cost saving, which is certain, shold take precedence over workers' expectations about returns,
which are highly uncertain, in a mandatory scheme").
36. Assuming annual contributions equal to two percent ofwages and annual administra-
tive costs equal to 0.1% of asset value, an average-wage male worker born in 1984 who retires
at the end of a forty-five-year career may expect to accumulate an account balance of $125,430
(in 1998 dollars). See GAO, ADMSISTRATIVE CosTs, supra note 30, at 22-23. If annual
administrative costs rise to two percent, the expected balance drops to $75,995. See iaE at 23.
37. See PANEL ON PRIVATZATION, supra note 15, at 65. Alternatively, the government
could provide an explicit subsidy for small accounts in the form of "matching contributions" for
low earners; because it would render redistribution more transparent, this approach might prove
politically less palatable than a schedule of uniform charges based on asset value. See id.; see
also Goldberg & Graetz, supra note 22, at 22 (suggesting that portion of administrative costs
might be financed from general revenues).
38. SeeHowellE.Jackson,DiscussioninFRAMINGTBESocIALSEcunr1YDEBATEsupra
note 2, at 329, 342; Schieber & Shoven, supra note 33, at 65 (suggesting that management fees
be capped at one percent of asset value "or some other reasonable level").
39. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 8431-8440e (1994) (establishing Thrift Savings Plan).
40. The TSP currently offers its participants a choice of the following three index invest-
ment funds: a government securities fund, a common stock fund, and a fixed income fund. See
FED. RET. TBRIT INV. BD., THRIFT SAVINGS PLAN: GUIDE TO TSP INvESTMENTS 2-3 (1998);
GAO, IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES, supra note 13, at 25. Recently, the TSP's investment board
announced plans to add the following two additional funds: a small capitalization fund and an
international stock fund. See GAO, IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES, supra note 13, at 34.
41. See Mitchell, supra note 20, at 439 (citing TSP as example of "scale economies
feasible in a centrally managed, large defined-contribution pension plan that restricts its invest-
ment choices to a very small set of indexes"). By one estimate, the annual administrative costs
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observers, however, point out that the TSP is a special case and doubt whether
its success can be replicated in a comprehensive national retirement system. 42
In part, the TSP functions well because it is essentially a single-employer plan
with ready access to centralized recordkeeping and services. The federal
government, as employer and plan sponsor, distributes forms and other materi-
als, educates employees about investment choices, and ensures timely and
accurate transmission of information concerning payroll deductions and other
matters. 43 In addition, TSP participants tend to be older, change jobs less
frequently, and earn higher average wages than the general work force covered
by Social Security.' Finally, interms ofthe number ofaccounts and aggregate
asset value, the TSP does not approach the size of a national system. 45
Most privatization proposals contemplate a single set of investment
options - either broad or narrow - for all participants. It would be possible,
however, to design a hybrid system with two tiers, such as a basic, low-cost
tier offering a limited range of passively managed index funds, coupled with
a supplemental tier offering a broader range of actively managed investment
options and services at a correspondingly higher cost.46 The constrained basic
tier would meet the needs of participants seeking a low-cost investment
vehicle with limited options and few services, while the more flexible supple-
mental tier would allow participants, at their own expense, to pursue invest-
ment strategies more closely tailored to their own risk and return preferences.
Arguably, a two-tier approach might balance competing objectives and con-
cerns more effectively than any single set of investment options.47 Moreover,
a two-tier arrangement could encourage financial intermediaries to compete
of a similar system for workers covered by social security would be around 0.2-0.3% of asset
value. See id. at 448; cf. Goldberg & Graetz, supra note 22, at 21 (estimating annual adminis-
trative costs at 0.3-0.5% of asset value).
42. See Francis Y. Cavanaugh, Discussion, in FRAMING THE SOCIAL SECURTY DEBATE,
supra note 2, at 319, 323 (arguing that TSP demonstrates feasibility of centralized trust fund
investment but is "not a proper model for individual investment accounts in the Social Security
program").
43. See GAO, ADMINIsTRATIVE COSTs, supra note 30, at 7 n.10 (noting that separate
government agency "provides detailed recordkeeping and software development and maintains
an office to provide service to participants"); Cavanaugh, supra note 42, at 524-25.
44. See GAO, ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS, supra note 30, at 17.
45. In 1995, the TSP had around two million participants and around $36 billion in assets.
See Mitchell, supra note 20, at 439 & 441 tbL 10.13.
46. Alternatively, all participants might initially be assigned to the basic tier until their
account balances reached a certain level and then be permitted to move into the supplemental
tier. See GAO, MPLIEMENTATION ISSUES, supra note 13, at 35.
47. See Goldberg & Graetz, supra note 22, at 25-26 (arguing that two-tier approach might
help to keep costs low to reduce "marketing abuses," and to mitigate "pressure to impose de-
tailed regulations"); see also John B. ShovenIntroduction, in ADMIIsTRATiVEASPECTS, supra
note 22, at 3 (suggesting that basic government-sponsored plan would "discipline the private-
sector offerings").
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for large accounts by offering abroad range ofsophisticated investment options
and services.4
In a two-tier system, the question arises whether participants should be
required to maintain a specified account balance in the basic tier before
becoming eligible to invest in the supplemental tier. Such a requirement
would encourage participants to hold some minimum level of assets in rela-
tively safe investment vehicles and would limit the availability of more
aggressive risk-taking to those who could afford to sustain substantial losses.
Thus, a mandatory basic tier would guard against excessively risky investment
behavior as well as the related problem of a potential government bail-out for
participants with poor investment outcomes.49
As a practical matter, however, a two-tier system might generate new
pressures that could undermine the long-term stability of the system. If the
basic tier were mandatory up to a specified account balance, the system would
be open to criticism on the ground that it would create two classes ofpartici-
pants. Those with large accounts would have access to the supplemental tier
with its higher level of services; they might also earn higher returns associated
with riskier investments or superior management. Participants with small
accounts would be relegated to the basic tier with its constrained investment
options and more limited services; they might receive lower investment
returns, albeit with less risk. As a result, there might be considerable pressure
to relax orto eliminate restrictions on access to the supplemental tier. Support
for a mandatory basic tier could further be eroded by the widespread tendency
to underestimate the level of assets needed to provide an adequate stream of
retirement income.5
0
If the supplemental tier became freely available to all participants, the
basic tier might eventually function simply as a default setting for participants
who fail to select a different investment option. There would be no assurance,
however, that those who opt out of the basic tier would be better off as a
result. Ultimately, the goal of ensuring some minimally adequate level of
retirement income for all participants may require mandatory constraints on
investment options for all personal accounts, regardless of size. If some
participants wishto pursue igh-risk investment strategies with their own non-
retirement assets, they would be able to do so without increasing the cost of
the national retirement system.
48. See ADvIsoRY CouNCIL REPORT, supra note 3, at 73 (predicting "explosion of mar-
keting efforts" as result ofprivatization).
49. See infra notes 83-93 and accompanying text (discussing government guarantees).
50. See Hugh Heclo, A Political Science Perspective on Social Security Reform, in
FRAMING TE SOCIAL SECURrY DEBATE, supra note 2, at 65, 85 & n.12 (noting that "wealth
illusion" may cause individuals systematically to underestimate level of saving needed to fund
retirement).
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2. Regulatory Response
Although offering a broad range of investment options would maximize
individual choice, it might also create a need for increased government
regulation to monitor financial intermediaries and to protect individual partici-
pants. Under some proposals, various types of financial intermediaries -
including banks, insurance companies, investment companies, and perhaps
registered broker-dealers - would be eligible to manage personal accounts.5
Identifying and monitoring such a large number of diverse financial intermedi-
aries would pose a daunting regulatory challenge. In response, it might be
possible to designate a limited number of qualified providers with strong
capitalization and compliance records.52 Limiting entry might well provoke
opposition from excluded providers. More importantly, however, it would
narrow the scope of the problem without addressing the fundamental issues
of oversight and enforcement for qualified providers.
One possible approach would be to build on existing regulatory systems
to implement separate standards for each type of financial intermediary (e.g.,
banks, insurance companies, investment companies). This "functional" ap-
proach, however, would generate a motley patchwork of different standards
and structures for various types of providers.5" To ensure more uniform and
consistent standards, it might be preferable to enact overarching legislation,
administered by one or more federal agencies, applicable to all providers
acting as managers of personal accounts. 4
If individual participants are to assume responsibility for making choices
that affect their retirement income security, they must have at least a rudimen-
51. Cf ERISA § 3(38), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(38) (1994) (requiring that "investment man-
ager" responsible for managing plan assets must be bank, insurance company, or investment
adviser registered under Investment Advisors Act of 1940).
52. The number of qualified providers might be limited, at least initially, to no more than
fifty. See Jackson, supra note 38, at 341 (noting that limiting number of qualified providers
would "ease supervision and reduce the likelihood of compliance problems"). The. optimal
number and range of qualified providers might increase over time with the growth of assets in
the system. See James et al., supra note 33, at 118 (noting that entry might initially be limited
to firms offering passive index funds selected through competitive bidding process and later
opened up to active managers who agreed to operate within specified cost constraints); see also
GAO, IMPISM rATION ISSUES, supra note 13, at 26 (noting that in Chile, workers may select
from twelve or more qualified pension funds).
53. See Jackson, supra note 38, at 340-41; Roberta S. Karmel, The Challenge to Finan-
cial Regulators Posed by Social Security PrNatization, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 1043, 1075-76
(1998) (noting problems with functional approach).
54. See Jackson, supra note 38, at 341. By analogy, ERISA entrusts oversight responsi-
bility for private pension plans to various agencies, including the Department of Labor's
Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, the Treasury Department, and the Pension Bene-
fit Guaranty Corporation. See GAO, IMPIEMENTATON ISSUES, supra note 13, at 19.
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tary understanding of basic financial concepts, investment strategies, and goals
of retirement saving." At present, however, "most Americans know little
about managing personal finances and their choices reflect this ignorace."56
Accordingly, a massive campaign of investor education would be necessary to
achieve even a minimally adequate level of financial literacy. The wider the
range of available investnmnt options, the greater the need for investor educa-
tion concerning risk and return characteristics of particular types of invest-
ments and the role of diversification.57 In a system with a broad range of
investment options, increased competition among qualified providers also
might require special measures to protect participants from fraud." It remains
unclear how the need for investor education would be met and who would bear
the costs.59 Furthermore, while efforts at investor education might be helpful,
their efficacy cannot be guaranteed.6
To mitigate the risk of harm to individual participants from inappropriate
investment decisions, it might be necessary to impose a fiduciary duty on
qualified providers to steer participants toward "suitable" investment options.6'
55. See GAO, CAP1rALMAR S, supra note 12, at 50-63 (discussing need for investor
education).
56. B. Douglas Bernheim, Financial Illiteracy, Education, and Retirement Saving, in
IriNGWrHDEFN CONTRBUnioNPENsIoNs: RENMAmGRESPONSIBuYORRETRmENT
38, 43 (Olivia S. Mtchell & Sylvester J. Schieber eds., 1998); see also GAO, CAPITAL MAR-
KETS, .pra note 12, at 59 (reporting that "over half of allAmericans do not knowthe difference
between a stock and a bond," and less than half of mutual fund investors correctly understand
purpose of diversification).
57. See GAO, CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 12, at 60-63.
58. See id, at 61 (noting that broad range of investment options would provide "opportu-
nities for fraud and sales practice abuses"); see also James et al., supra note 33, at 119 (noting
that "while information is imparted by marketing, investment companies and brokers have a
clear incentive to impart misleading information").
59. See GAO, ADMSTRATrvE COSTS, supra note 30, at 22 (noting that government,
employers, and investment managers might each bear some responsibilities and costs, depending
on system design); see also Schieber & Shoven, supra note 33, at 55 (noting that "giving
workers control or an active role in the investment of their retirement savings is likely to
spur... more financial education").
60. See Bernheim, supra note 56, at 64. See generally James A. Fanto, We're All Capi-
talists Now: The Importance, Nature, Provision and Regulation of Investor Education, 49
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 105 (1998); James et al., supra note 35, at 281 (noting that "an entire
generation of workers may pass through the system before low-cost, high-performing funds are
identified"). This situation is exacerbated by inexperienced investors' difficulty in understand-
ing financial information.
61. See Jackson, supra note 38, at 342. Under ERISA's "exclusive benefit rule," a plan
fiduciary must discharge its duties solely in the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries
and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to them. See ERISA § 404(aX1XAXi), 29
U.S.C. § 1104(aX1XA)(i) (1994). The implementing regulations specify factors that a fiduciary
must consider in making investment decisions. See 29 C.F.R § 2550A04a-1(bX2) (2000); cf
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Here, the fiduciary standards of ERISA could serve as a useful starting point.62
ERISA gives employers a strong incentive to provide investor education in
order to meet their fiduciary duties.63 Under a safe harbor for "self-directed"
accounts, however, a plan sponsor can avoid liability for losses arising from
poor investment decisions by giving participants control over their own ac-
counts.' To come within the safe harbor, the plan must offer participants a
choice of at least three alternative investment options consisting of diversified
funds with materially different risk and return features. 65 Participants also
must receive adequate information concerning the risk and return characteris-
tics and investment objectives of the available options.66 Within these general
parameters, participants enjoy considerable latitude in allocating their account
balances among particular funds.67
Imposing fiduciary duties may mitigate investment risks for individual
participants. However, such regulation may prove quite costly and may
dampen competition among qualified providers.6s Ultimately, allowing wide
freedom of choice within a framework of strict fiduciary duties may prove
Deborah M. Weiss, The Regulation ofFunded Social Secui, 64 BROoK. L. REv. 993, 1016
(1998) (referring to ERISA's "inadequate fiduciary rules").
62. See KELLYA. OLSEN & DALLAs L. SALIsBURY, IlDI uAL SocIAL SEcryAc-
COUNTS: ISSUESiNASSESSiNGADmI sTRATVEFEASIBUTYAND COSTS 31 (Employee Benefit
Research Inst, Issue Brief No. 203, 1998) (noting that ERISA "portends a large role for
government regulation" of personal accounts).
63. See Mitchell, supra note20, at 435 (noting that employers who sponsor 401(k) plans
make substantial expenditures for investor education and periodic account statements to partic-
ipants due to concerns about potential fiduciary liability).
64. See ERISA § 404(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (2000)
(inplementing regulations); see also PAMELA PERUN & C. EUGENE STEUERIE, DECONSTRUCT-
ING ERISA 14-15 (Brookings Inst, Stanford Inst for Econ. Policy Research, & TIAA-CREF
Inst, Conference on Pub. Policies and Private Pensions, 2000) (manuscript on file) (noting that
in 1997,404(c) plans accounted for "65% of the assets of profit-sharing plans and almost 70%
of all active participants"); Gordon P. Goodfellow & Sylvester . Schieber, Investment ofAssets
in Self-DirectedReirementPlans, in POSIrION!NhoPENSIONS FORTHE TWENTY-FRST CENTIRY
67, 72 (Michael S. Gordon et al eds., 1997) (describing employers' movement toward 404(c)
plans as "further effort to pass on the risk of negative market performance to the plan partici-
pants"); Regina T. Jefferson, Rethinking the Risk of Defined Contribution Plans, 4 FLA. TAX
REv. 607,632-36 (2000) (discussing 404(c) plans).
65. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(bX3) (2000).
66. See GAO, CAPrrAL MARKETS, supra note 12, at 52-53 (describing disclosure rules).
67. For example, an employee may choose to direct investments to a specific investment
category within a diversified pool (e.g., small capitalization stocks or international stocks). See
Pozen & Kimpel, supra note 24, at 374.
68. See GAO, ImIBMiENTATION ISSUES, supra note 13, at29 (noting that in Chile, "fund
managers tend to hold portfolios of assets that are similar to the ones held by their competi-
tors," thereby limiting "the variety of choice and earnings potential of the privately managed
funds").
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more costly and intrusive than direct constraints on the available investment
options.69
3. Investment Risk
A broad range of investment options increases the risk that some partici-
pants will have inadequate savings at retirement. Some participants may
receive relatively low returns as a result of conservative investment decisions,
while others may incur large losses due to excessive risk-taking. Even if
markets perform well over the long term, different cohorts may earn dramati-
cally different returns due to market fluctuations. 70 Those who happen to
retire when the market has soared to new heights (or dived to new depths)
would find themselves locked into unexpectedly high (or low) levels of in-
come during retirement. 71 As a result of poor investint decisions or simple
bad luck, some individuals would undoubtedly end up with inadequate bal-
ances in their personal accounts at retirement.
Allocation of investment assets is likely to play a crucial role in deter-
mining the adequacy of retirement income. Despite the shift toward increased
individual responsibility in 401(k) plans, there is little consensus concerning
how well individual 401(k) participants manage their portfolios. Many
observers have expressed concern that 401(k) participants are likely to wind
up with inadequate retirement savings becanse of excessively conservative
investments or lack of adequate diversification.72 Influenced perhaps by the
recent stock market boom, however, participants have invested an increasing
percentage of their 401(k) assets in equities. 3 Some observers warn that
69. See Jackson, supra note 38, at 345 ("As a practical matter, the more... constraints one
imposes, the more sensible it would be to rely on an individual account-style approach where the
government itself provides the investment choices."); see also Peter A. Diamond, Macroeco-
nomic Aspects ofSocialSecurity Reform, in 2 BROOKGINS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC AcVITY 1,
51 (William C. Brainard & George L. Perry eds., 1997) (noting that "tight regulatory structure
[might] forfeit some ofthe political insulation that comes from individual portfolio choice").
70. See GAO, CAFTrAL MARKETS, supra note 12, at 39-40.
71. See Lawrence 11 Thompson, IndiMdual Uncertainty in Retirement Income Planning
under Different Public Pension Regimes, in FRAMNG TFH SOCIAL SECURITY DEBATE, supra
note 2, at 113,121-29.
72. See STEVENA. SASS,THEPROMISEoFPRIVAiEPENSIONs: TEFRSTHUNDREDYEARS
249 (1997) (noting that "most participants are notoriously conservative investors"); Jeffrey N.
Gordon, Employees, Pensions, and the New Economic Order, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1519,1540
(1997) (noting that "the investment strategy selected for defined contribution funds is often far
too conservative"). Investments in 401(k) plans may be unduly concentrated in employer stocks.
See Vickie L. Baftelsmit & Jack L. VanDerhei, RiskAversion and Pension Investment Choices,
in PosoNING PENSIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 64, at 55 (noting that
"[n]ot only is the pension underdiversified, but the employee has both human and financial
capital tied to the success or failure of a single business").
73. See James M. Poterba & David A. Wise,IndividualFinancialDecisions inRefirement
SavingPlans and the Provision ofResourcesforRetirement, in PRIVATIZlMG SOCIAL SECURIT,
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401(k) participants may now be investing too heavily in equities, potentially
exposing themselves to severe repercussions in the event of a sharp stock
market decline.74 Others maintain that 401(k) participants have adapted well
to their new responsibilities and are investing in a manner that conforms to
reasonable expectations."
Because 401(k) participants tend to have more education and higher
incomes than other workers, generalizations based on the 401(k) investment
experience are hazardous at best.76 Moreover, in making current asset alloca-
tion decisions, 401(k) participants presumably take their expected future social
security benefits into account. Without those benefits, participants might
invest their 401(k) balances less aggressively.77 Thus, projections based on
existing 401(k) asset allocations may overstate the likely investment returns
on personal accounts.7
Demographic and socioeconomic factors may also play an important role
in influencing asset allocation. For example, to the extentthat wealthier house-
holds tend to have higher risk tolerance than poorer households, broad invest-
ment options may exacerbate existing wealth discrepancies.79 Similarly,
supra note 4, at 373 (noting that in 1995, around one-half of 401(k) assets were invested in
equities); James M. Poterba et aL, 401(k) Plans and Future Patterns of Retirement Saving, 88
AM. ECON. REV. 179,181 (1998).
74. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHIIRIRRATIONALEXUBERANCE 218 (2000) ("Many partici-
pants no doubt put virtually all of their pension funds into the stock market"); see also id. at
218 n.11 (noting that percentage of TIAA-CREF participants who allocate one hundred percent
of their contributions to stock increased from around three percent in 1986 to around twenty-
two percent in 1996).
75. See, e.g., Robert L. Clark et al., Making the Most of 401(k) Plans: Who's Choosing
What and Why?, in FORECASTING RETIREMENT NEEDS AND RETIREMENT WEALTH 95, 127
(Olivia S. Mitchell et al. eds., 2000) (suggesting that 401(k) experience should "dispel some of
the concerns associated with individual accounts").
76. Even among 401(k) participants, the level of financial literacy may be unacceptably
low. See GAO, CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 12, at 59 (finding that "it is clear that among
those who save through their company's retirement programs or on their own, there are large
percentages of the investing population who do not fully understand what they are doing");
Jefferson, supra note 64, at 635 (noting that "it is not uncommon for plan participants to have
inflated opinions about their investment expertise").
77. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECuiTrY REFORM. IMPUcAIIONS FOR
PRIVATEPENIONS (GAO/HEHS-00-187), REPORTTOTHE CHAIMMAN,HOUSECOMM. ON WAYS
AND MEANS 30-31 (2000); CORI E. UCCELLO, 401(k) INvEsTMENT DECISIONS AND SOCIAL
SECURrrY REFORM 5 (Ctr. for Ret Research at Boston Coll., Working Paper No. 2000-04,
2000).
78. See UCCELLO, supra note 77, at 5; see also Gregory, supra note 17, at 324 (noting un-
certainty as to whether participants would be "more aggressive" or "more risk-adverse" in their
investment choices).
79. See Bajtelsmit & VanDerhei, supra note 72, at 55. For some individuals, particularly
those with lower incomes, the "potential disutility from losing even a small amount of value in
PRIVATIZDNG SOCIAL SECURITY
evidence that women tend to invest more conservatively than men may imply
gender disparities in retirement income. ' While income and education appear
to be better predictors of investment behavior than race, some observers
express concern that minorities may tend to choose investments with relatively
low levels of risk and correspondingly low returns.8' Thus, differences in risk
preferences, combined with the trend toward greater individual investment
responsibility, may translate into lower retirement income for those groups
most "at risk," including low-income workers, women, and minorities. 82
To mitigate individual investment risks, the government might well be
called upon to guarantee a minimum account balance or rate of return on
accounts."' Some privatization proposals attempt to sidestep the problem of
individual risk by promising participants the higher of current Social Security
benefits or benefits attributable to their personal accounts. 4 If contributions
to personal accounts were limited to two percent of covered payroll, partici-
their assets outweighs the added potential utility from substantially larger gains." Goodfellow
& Schieber, supra note 64, at 73.
80. See Richard P. Ilinz et al, Are Women Conservative Investors? Gender Differences
inParficipant-DirectedPensionlnvestments,inPOSTONNGPENSIONSFORTHETWENTY-FRrST
CENTURY, supra note 64, at 99 (finding that women tend to be more risk averse than men based
on survey of TSP participants); cf Clark et al., supra note 75, at 125-27 (finding little difference
in 401(k) investment patterns by gender); Leslie E. Papke, How Are Participants Investing
TheirAccounts in Participant-DirectedIndiMdualAccountPension Plans?, 88 AM. ECON. REV.
212,215 (1998) (same).
81. See Bernheim, supra note 56, at 47 ("Differences based on gender and race are sta-
tistically significant, even holding other variables (such as education and earnings) constant.").
82. See Bajtelsmit & VanDerhei, supra note 72, at 62 ("If certain groups, particularly
those that already have lower income and wealth, exhibit different risk preferences, income and
wealth differentials in retirement will be even greater."); Kathzyn L. Moore, Partial Privatiza-
tion ofSocialSecurity: AssesingltsEffect on Women, Minorities, andLower-Income Workers,
65 Mo. L. REV. 341,352-66,402 (2000).
83. See PANEL ON PRIVATIZATION, supra note 15, at 55 (noting that "there will be calls
for the government to insure promised returns"); Stephen G. Kellison & Marilyn Moon, New
Opportunitiesfor the Social Security System, in PROSPECTS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM.,
supra note 9, at 72-73. For example, such guarantees are a feature of the privatized system in
Chile. See Peter A. Diamond & Salvador Vald&-Prieto, Social Security Reforms, in TBE
CHIL.EN ECONOMY: POuCYLESsoNs AND CHALENGES 304-05 (BarryP. Bosworth et al. eds.,
1994).
84. See Andrew B. Lyon & John L. Stell, Analys of Current Social Security Reform
Proposals, 53 NAT'L TAX J. 473,474-79 (2000) (discussing Archer-Shaw "Social Security Guar-
antee Plan"). The Archer-Shaw plan would guarantee social security benefits at their existing
level, but would reduce them dollar-for-dollar by the annuitized value of personal accounts. See
id.; cf MARTJN FELDSTEIN & ANDREW SAMWICK, TWO PERCENT PERSONAL RETIREm
ACCOUNTS: THRmPOTENIALEFECrsONSOCIALSEcuRnYTARAiEsANDNAiIONALSAVING
1-3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6540, 1998) (outlining similar plan
with reduction limited to seventy-five percent of value ofpersonal accounts).
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pants would have to earn extremely high returns to outperform social security
in the near term. Thus, the principal effect of such Social Security guarantees
may be to infuse general revenues into the existing system while offering a
lucrative new source of business for the mutual fund industry.s
From the perspective ofthe individual participant, Social Security guaran-
tees combined with personal accounts have the effect of altering the composi-
tion of benefits."6 If expected stock market returns are realized, an increasing
proportion of retirement benefits would be funded from personal accounts over
time. Substituting personal account benefits for Social Security benefits, par-
ticularly among high and moderate earners, might eventually weaken support
for the existing collective defined benefit systemYr Perhaps the greater risk is
that expected market returns could fail to materialize and the cost of residual
government guarantees could exceed unfunded liabilities under the existing
system.s' The government might come under considerable pressure to reduce
such guarantees to avoid shifting the risk of lower-than-expected returns to
younger and future workers in the form of higher taxes. 9
Government guarantees to compensate individual losses may encourage
excessive risk taking.' This problem could be reduced by having the govern-
ment guarantee only the return on a "standardized" portfolio - e.g., the return
85. Under theArcher-Shaw plan, contributions to personal accounts would be funded from
general revenues (based on a combination of projected budget surpluses and additional borrow-
ing) through an annual income tax credit equal to two percent of covered payroll. See Lyon &
Stell, supra note 84, at 477.
86. See id. at 498 (noting that "the total benefit remains the same, but the composition
would change to include the private account annuity").
87. See Alicia H. Munnell, Reforming Social Security: The Case Against Individual
Accounts, 52 NAT'L TAX . 803, 811 (1999) (noting that high and moderate earners "would lose
a large percentage oftheir Social Security benefits under the offset provision").
88. See KENT SMETrRS, THE DESIGNAND COSTOFPENSIONGUAPANTEES I (Brookings
Inst., Stanford Inst. for Econ. Policy Research, & TIAA-CREF Inst., Conference on Pub.
Policies and Private Pensions, 2000) (manuscript on file) (noting that under one recent proposal,
"the unfunded liability associated with [a] minimum benefit guarantee could actually be larger
than Social Security's existing unfunded liability"); Lyon & Stell, supra note 84, at 506 (noting
that, despite large infusion of general revenues, low returns could cause actuarial imbalance
under Archer-Shaw plan).
89. See Munnell, supra note 87, at 811 (noting that benefit reductions could "significantly
hurt future retirees who have not been lucky enough to participate in the surplus bonanza"). See
generally Kent Smetters, Three Key Design Issues in Analyzing the Trust Fund Investment
Policy, 52 NAT'L TAX . 531 (1999) (discussing allocation of intergenerational risk if realized
returns differ from expected returns).
90. A government guarantee would effectively increase the expected return from risky
investments. See STAFF OF JOINT CoMM. ON TAXATION, ANALYSIS OF IssuEs RELATmNG TO
SocLAL SECURrr PmRVATEAccOUNTs 61-62 (JCX-14-99) (1999) (noting that in extreme case,
"the risky investment actually has no downside risk, since the government will make up all the
losses").
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that an individual participant would have earned by investing in a broadly
diversified equity index and corporate bond fund?1 Individual participants
would thus bear the risk of deviating from the standardized portfolio. This
approach is problematic, however, because it ignores the risks inherent in the
standardized portfolio. Assumptions concerning historical real rates of return
on equities may prove unduly optimistic, especially given current high stock
market valuations and projected low rates of economic growth.' As a practi-
cal matter, combining a guarantee of existing Social Security benefits with
personal accounts is unlikely to prove sustainable. 3 The reluctance of privat-
ization proponents to address explicitly the cost of government guarantees
may reflect the political controversy surrounding this issue.
4. Political Risk
In theory, the benefits of a diversified investment portfolio could be
achieved either through a centralized trust fund administered directly by the
government?4 or through a decentralized system of personal accounts con-
trolled by individual participants. A centralized trust fund poses the political
risk that accumulated funds may be used to mask deficits in the rest of the
federal budget. An important function of personal accounts, according to
proponents, is that they put retirement funds beyond the reach of the govern-
ment and thereby remove the temptation to use those funds to finance deficit
spending?5 In one sense, then, personal accounts may be viewed as a form of
public fiscal discipline.
91. See Martin Feldstein et al., The Transition to lnvesment-Based Social Security When
Portfolio Reftuns and Capital ProfitabilityAre Uncertain, in RIK =AE OF NVEsTMENr-
BASED SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 41,69 (John Y. Campbell & Martin Feldstein eds., 2001).
92. SeCPE I A.DIAMONDWHATSTOCKMARTRETRNTOEXPEFORE FUUE?
2 (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Boston Coil. ed., 1999). Based on historical simulations, critics of
trust fund investment have pointed out that Social Security returns might have been lower in
approximately one out of four intervals examined had the government invested in a diversified
portfolio of equities rather than in an all-bond portfolio. See Thomas E. MaCurdy & John B.
Shoven, Asset Allocation and RiskAllocation: Can Social Security Improve Its Future Sol-
vency Problem by Investing in Private Securities?, in RISK ASPECTS OF INVESTMENT-BASED
SOcIAL SEcuRrY REFORM, supra note 91, at 18; id. at 27 (noting that "(t]he extra risks of
stocks translate directly into riskier future benefits and taxes).
93. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text (discussing government guarantees).
A more realistic outcome might be a minimum floor of guaranteed benefits that would provide
a safety net for those who would otherwise be near the poverty level. See ADVISORY COUNCIL
REPORT, supra note 3, at 30-31 (describing flat benefit under PSA plan).
94. See ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 3, at 25-27 (proposing retention of
existing Social Security system, with up to forty percent of trust funds eventually to be invested
in stock market).
. 95. See Manger, supra note 6, at 796 (suggesting that "if political constraints make it im-
possible to prefund in government accounts, then prefunding in private accounts would be a
viable option").
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Shifting control of funds from the government to individual participants,
however, may replace one type of political risk with another. To the extent
that participants view their personal accounts as merely another form of tax-
favored private savings, they may expect to be able to tap into those savings
for specified purposes (e.g., to purchase a home, finance an education, or pay
medical expenses) prior to retirement, as is presently allowed in the case of
401(k) plans.' The problem would be especially acute in a two-tier system
because considerations of fairness would make it difficult to maintain restric-
tions on access to the basic tier (when the reasons for such restrictions would
be strongest), while providing more lenient treatment for the supplemental
tier. 7 Even if early access were allowed initially only in cases of hardship,
it might prove politically impossible to resist demands for more general early
access.' Failure to maintain restrictions on early access could compromise
the financial security of individual participants and would seriously under-
mine the viability of a universal system of mandatory retirement savings.9
Another type of political risk arises from the possibility of government
interference in capital markets. In the case of a centralized system adminis-
tered by the government, one concern is that the government might seek to
influence corporate decision-making through the exercise of stock voting
rights. This concern could be addressed by prohibiting the exercise of voting
rights with respect to government-held stocke ° or by specifying fiduciary
96. See Thompson, supra note 71, at 132 (noting that existing law permits earlywithdraw-
als for home purchases and for medical or educational expenses, with result that "a substantial
portion of what is set aside in individual retirement savings programs may be dissipated prior to
retirement").
97. See STAFF OF JOINT CONM. ON TAXATION, supra note 90, at 33 (noting importance
of prohibiting early access to funds); see also Leonard E. Burman et al, Lump Sum Distribu-
tionsfrom Pension Plans: Recent Evidence and Issuesfor Policy and Research, 52 NAT'L TAX
J. 553, 559 (1999) (noting that "it could be that precisely the households for whom pensions are
most likely to represent additional saving are also the ones that are most likely not to retain that
saving"); Dallas L. Salisbury, Emplyers and Individuals Must Do More Today to Allow Retire-
ment Tomorrow, in FRAMING THE SOCIAL SECURITY DEBATE, supra note 2, at 95,103 (noting
that in 1990, "44 percent of the dollars paid in lump sum distributions [were] not saved for
retirement").
98. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 90, at 33 (noting that "if
individuals view private accounts ... as personal savings, or as supplements to other retirement
income, they may be more opposed to restrictions on preretirement access to funds"); Heclo,
supra note 50, at 85 (noting that "the political attraction of selling forced savings with the idea
that 'it's your own money' .. . will make it more difficult in the long run to sustain such nest
eggs for retirement").
99. See Gregory, supra note 17, at 324 (noting that optimistic assessments of boomer
generation's retirement prospects assume little oi no "leakage" from retirement plans).
100. See Theodore J. Angelis, Investing Public Money in Private Markets: ThatAre the
RightQuestions?, in FRAMINGTHESOCIALSECURnlYDEBATEsupra note 2, at287,306-07; see
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standards to ensure that voting rights be exercised solely to maximize share
values."' A related and more serious concern is that the government might
use investment decisions as a means to reward (or to punish) certain firms or
industries or as a means to advance (or to impede) certain fiscal, social, or
foreign policy agendas."°
In this respect, as in other matters ofinvestment management, the experi-
ence with the TSP is illuminating. The TSP appears to have been successful
in administering funds based solely on criteria of risk and return without
regard to extraneous considerations."ca Observers often attribute the TSP's
success to the following combination of institutional safeguards: an independ-
ent board, a strategy of investing in passively managed index funds, and a
strong commitment to political non-intervention.104 It is not clear, however,
whether the TSP's experience could be extrapolated to a much larger scale.
The sheer size ofthe funds involved might make government interference both
politically more tempting and financially more threatening." 5
In response to proponents of a system modeled on the TSP, critics point
to the activities of state and local pension plans. Managers of such plans are
sometimes perceived as pursuing politically-motivated investment strategies
at the expense of optimal returns.- 6' While managers of some state and local
also PANEL ONP IVATIZATION, supra note 15, at 22 (recommending that trust fund investment
be limited to between five and ten percent of stock of any single company).
101. See Angelis, supra note 100, at 307 (noting that under TSP, private managers exercise
voting rights to maximize investment returns). Allowing investment managers to vote fund
shares might also address the concern that large-scale passive investment would undercut the
role of shareholder activism in monitoring corporate governance. See ACA H. MUNNEIL &
PIRaiBAwUzz. NvEsnNGTBE SOCIAL SECurrY TRUST FUNDs INEQurrms 14-15 (Am.
Ass'n of Retired Pers., Pub. Policy Inst., Paper No. 9802, 1998) (noting that "studies suggest
that shareholder activism yields positive returns, although the evidence is inconclusive", cf
Weiss, supra note 61, at 998 (noting that exclusive reliance on passive investment policy in
funded system would create "significant risk of reducing ... active investment below the
acceptable level").
102. See Angelis, supra note 100, at292; Goldberg & Graetz, supra note 22, at22.
103. See Angelis, supra note 100, at 293 (noting that TSP has "successfully avoided the
problems of social investing"); Alicia H. Munnell, Introduction, in FRAMING THE SOCIAL
SECURrIY DEBATE, supra note 2,1,19-20 (comparing TSP and state pension funds).
104. See ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 3, at 155 (statement of Edward M.
Gramlich & Marc M Twinney) (proposing system of personal accounts based on TSP model
to minimize risk of "political interference in the operations of private business"); cf. HENRY 3.
AARON &ROBERTD. REISCHAUER, COUNTDOWN TO REFORM& THE GREAT SOCIAL SECuRriY
DEBATE 111 (1998) (noting that "organizational reforms could all but eliminate the risk of polit-
ical interference with investment decisions").
105. See P. Brett Hammond & Mark J. Warshawsky, Investing Social Security Funds in
Stocks, 13 BEEur Q. 52, 58 (1997) (projecting that centralized trust fund investments could
amount to five percent of total U.S. equities in 2020).
106. See Olivia S. Mitchell & Ping-Lung Hsin, Public Pension Governance and Perfor-
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pension plans have undoubtedly engaged in such behavior, other observers take
a more optimistic view, noting the "limited extent to which social or political
considerations affect the performance of state and local pension fimds.' '1°7
The risk of political interference in stock investments cannot be elimi-
nated entirely. Even the strongest safeguards would remain subject to the
political risk of revision or repeal by subsequent legislation, and the govern-
ment can always influence corporate behavior through direct regulation. By
comparison, the potential economic harm from government interference
through selection of investment managers or portfolio choices is likely to be
relatively attenuated. Even a decentralized system of personal accounts would
not necessarily be immune from government control."° Tax incentives and
penalties, as well as rules governing the treatment of accumulations and with-
drawals, could be used by the government to influence the investment behav-
ior of individual participants. These measures might prove politically contro-
versial, although perhaps no more so than an attempt to dismantle institutional
investment safeguards. Ultimately, assessing the risk of government interfer-
ence is "a matter of political prediction and, as such, inherently debatable."'"
C. Annuitization
The current defined benefit system protects beneficiaries against the risk
of outliving their retirement resources by providing inflation-adjusted, manda-
tory annuities. By contrast, a defined contribution system would raise issues
concerning how much choice individuals should have in structuring with-
drawal of their personal accounts. Left to their own devices, it is unclear
whether individuals would choose an adequate level of annuitization. The
existing annuity market is extremely thin, due in part to problems of adverse
selection, and the cost of annuities tends to be correspondingly high compared
to the stream of annuity payments." 0 Voluntary amuitization would exacer-
mance, in THE ECONOICS OF PENSIONS 92, 109 (Salvador Vald&-Prieto ed., 1997). See
generally Roberta RomanoPublic Pension FundActivism in Corporate GovernanceReconsid-
ered, 93 CoLU. L. REV. 795 (1993).
107. AuciA IL MuNNEEL & ANNIKA SuNDiN, INvESTMENT PRAcTCEs OF STATE AND
LOCAL PENSION FuNDs: IblICATIONS FOR SOCIAL SscuRny REFORM 35 (Ctr. for Ret
Research at Boston Coll., Working Paper No. 1999-01,1999); see id. at 3 (noting that "[t]oday,
public plans appear to be performing as well as private plans").
108. SeeAARON&REISCHAUER, supra note 104, at 113.
109. Jackson, supra note 38, at 331.
110. See James M. Poterba & Mark J. Warshawsky, The Costs ofAnnuitizing Retirement
Payoutsfrom IndividualAccounts, in ADMINISTRATIVEASPECTs, supra note 22, at 180 (noting
that for sixty-five-year-old male annuitant, based on general population mortality tables, expected
present value of annuity payments is approximately eighty-five percent of purchase price); see
also generallv Olivia S. Mitchell et al., New Evidence on the Money's Worth oflndividualAnnu-
ides, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 1299 (1999).
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bate problems of adverse selection and potentially place at risk long-lived
individuals with the greatest need for annutization. Just as some form of
mandatory savings is considered desirable to ensure an adequate level of
resources at retirement, some level of mandatory annuitization may be desir-
able to ensure an adequate level of income through the retirement period.
A centralized system of personal accounts administered by the govern-
ment might offer a low-cost means of providing mandatory annuities. Indeed,
some form of government-sponsored annuities may be necessary for partici-
pants with small accounts because annuitizing large numbers of such accounts
could prove uneconomical for private insurers."' The simplest alternative
would make use of the existing system to annuitize personal accounts. 2
Upon retirement, individual participants would transfer the balance in their
accounts to the Social Security Administration in exchange for additional
annuity benefits based on the value of their accounts. The government would
set the annuity amount by reference to the account balance and would accord-
ingly bear the associated investment and mortality risks. Retired workers
would receive a single monthly check reflecting the annuitized benefit from
their personal accounts and the adjusted amount of their residual Social
Security benefits.
Alternatively, the government could retain responsibility for processing
benefit payments, but contract with private providers to offer annuities on a
group basis."' Such contracting out might be considered desirable because
it would shift investment and mortality risks to the providers in the private
sector. The use of private providers would also minimize the danger that the
government might underprice annuities for current retirees and potentially
shift some of the annuity risk to taxpayers generally." 4 Even under a system
111. SeeGEN.AccOUNTNGOF cE, SOCLALSEcuRnYREFoMv IMPLICATIONSOFPRVATE
ANNUIIES FOR INDIVIDUAL AccouNTs (GAO/HEHs-99-160), REPORT TO TBE RANKING
MINORnY MEMBER, HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANs 10 (1999) [hereinafter GAO,
ANNUirs] (quoting comment from insurance industry that it would be "inefficient and costly
for insurers to provide annuities for individuals with small accounts"); GAO, IMP.MENTATION
ISSUES, supra note 13, at41.
112. See GAO, ANNurrIES, supra note 111, at 10; PANEL ON PRIVATIZATION, supra note
15, at 69; Goldberg & Oractz, supra note 22, at 28.
113. See GAO, ANNUrrIES, supra note 111, at 10 (noting that insurance companies could
submit competitive bids to provide group annuities for cohort of retirees); PANEL ON PRIVATIZA-
lION, supra note 15, at 69; Goldberg & Graetz, supra note 22, at 28. For example, the TSP
solicits bids from private insurance companies to provide annuities to TSP participants. See
Poterba & Warshawsky, supra note 110, at 185; see also Mark . Warshawsky, The Marketfor
IndividualAnnuities and the Reform ofSocialSecurity, 13 BENEFITS Q. 66, 75 (1997) (suggest-
ing creation of "federal board of overseers of annuity providers" to administer national clearing
house).
114. See Diamond, supra note 34, at 148 ('ith private provision, the political outcome
is more likely to be to accept the prices offered by the market").
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of privately provided annuities, however, the government would presumably
continue to bear the residual risk that private providers would be unable to
satisfy their annuity payment obligations. 1 5 Without relatively tight supervi-
sion and regulation of providers, however, it would be impossible for the
government to limit its potential liabilities. 6
Allowing participants to purchase annuities from private providers would
permit greater flexibility of payout options.' Because the total administra-
tive costs for annuities purchased in the private market could be quite high -
as much as fifteen percent of the purchase price 8 - a default system of gov-
ernment-sponsored annuities might be essential unless the annuity market
could be made significantly more efficient. Although higher administrative
costs would be borne directly by individual participants purchasing annuities
from private providers, there might still be a need for government regulation
to mitigate adverse selection and risk segmentation. 9 Thus, the government
might still play a significant role in ensuring that private annuity markets
operated efficiently and fhirly.
Although mandatory annuitization would help to reduce costs, it would
also redistribute costs from shorter-lived to longer-lived groups. For example,
sex-neutral mortality rates would favor women over men, on average.1 20 An-
115. See PA mONPRrvATizATON, supra note 15, at 69. Although insurance companies
traditionally have been subject to regulation at the state level, the federal government's residual
risk might give rise to regulation at the federal level. See id.; see also GAO, ANNUrrMS, supra
note 111, at 22-23 (discussing possibility of "federal guaranty" for annuities).
116. See GAOANNUrriEs, supra note 111, at 23; JanWalliser, Regulation of Withdrawals
in IndiMdualAccount Systems, in NEW IDEAS ABoUT OLD AGE SECURITY, supra note 35, at
367, 386 (noting that regulation of private annuity providers would be necessary to reduce cost
of implicit or explicit government guarantees).
117. See Goldberg & Graelz, supra note 22, at29 (noting thatwider range of annuity choices
would permit alternative payment streams or provide funds for special needs such as caring for
disabled children or early retirement); cf Walliser, supra note 116, at 383 (noting competing
goals of providing flexible payout options and allowing insurance markets to function properly).
118. See GAO, ANNurrms, supra note 111, at 18-19; see also supra note 110 (noting
potential cost of annuities).
119. See Goldberg & Graetz, supra note 22, at 13 (suggesting that private annuity provid-
ers "be required to provide all-comers annuities at the same age-based price"); Poterba & War-
shawsky, supra note 110, at 179 (noting that system of personal accounts, coupled with manda-
tory annuitization, would "reduce adverse selection, although it would not eliminate it entirely
because individuals would still presumably be allowed choices among annuity options and the
age of settlement").
120. See GAO, ANNUis, supra note 111, at 15-16 (noting clear sex-based differences
in mortality rates as well as potential correlation of mortality rates with "differences in income,
race, education, and marital status"). The individual annuities market is not generally subject
to mandatory use of unisex mortality tables. See ia The effect of differential mortality rates
could be reduced by permitting purchase of a "life with term-certain" annuity. See id. at 17.
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nuity choices also raise sensitive issues concerning allocation of resources
within the family. The existing system provides spousal and survivor benefits
without any reduction inthe primary worker's annuity. Because these benefits
would not be replihcted by a system of private annuities, it would be necessary
to consider carefully the implications of expanded choice on the economic
welfare of particularly vulnerable groups. In the case of married couples,
mandatory annuities could contain ajoint-and-survivor feature to avoid exac-
erbating the risk of poverty for widows in old age."'
The shift from the existing defined benefit system to a defined contribu-
tion system would also introduce new financial risks for participants. De-
pending on when an annuity is purchased, participants with identical personal
account balances could receive significantly different annuity payments due
to interest rate fluctuations."z Some mechanism would be needed to mitigate
the effect of changing interest rates, such as permitting retirees to purchase
annuities in installments over several years.
Some proponents of privatization suggest that problems with the private
annuities market can be managed by allowing participants to purchase variable
rather than fixed annuities from the same qualified providers who managed
their personal accounts prior to retirement." Variable annuities are attractive
because they would permit continued investment of personal accounts in the
equities market, earning relatively high returns even after retirement. While
variable annuities would maximize the expected return from personal accounts
and might provide a hedge against inflation,'24 they would also increase the
overall financial risk. Depending on the performance ofthe underlying invest-
ment portfolio, returns from variable annuities could fluctuate significantly
from one year to the next.
121. See Karen C. Burke& Grayson M.P. McCouch, Thelmpact ofSocialSecurityReform
on Women's Economic Security, 16 N.Y.L. SCa J. HUM. RTS. 375, 394-95 (1999); see also
JEFFEY R. BROWN & MARK J. WARSHAWSKY, LONGEvrTY-INSURED RETiREMENT DISTRIBU-
TIONS FROMPENSIONPLANS: MIAKETANDREGULATORYISSUES 16-18 (Nat'lBureau ofEcon.
Research, Working Paper No. 8064, 2001) (noting that 401(k) plans are required to provide
qualified joint and survivor annuities only if they offer annuity payout option and that annuity
payout options arc generally not available).
122. See GAO, ANNUr , supra note 111, at 11 (noting effectofinterest rate assumptions
on annuity payments).
123. See MARTIN FEIDSTEIN & ELENA RANGUELOVA, INDIVIDUAL RISK IN AN INvEST-
MENT-BASED SOCIAL SECURny SYsTEM 4,7 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 8074,2001).
124. See Jeffrey R. Brown et al., The Role of Real Annuities and Indexed Bonds in an
Individual Accounts Retirement Program, in RISK ASPECTS OF INVEsTMENT-BASED SOCIAL
SECUlYREFORM, supra note 91, at 356-57; see also id. at 337-38 (noting "perennial question
of why retirees are not more concerned about inflation protection").
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Relying on variable annuities to produce the appropriate overall level of
annuitization seems impractical. A series of poor investment returns would
erode substantially the value of such annuities, exposing participants to the
risk of inadequate retirement income or inflating the cost of residual govern-
ment guarantees."n Projections based onthe assumption that participants will
purchase variable annuities at retirement understate the real cost of annuiti-
zation. If annuities were fixed in amount, the annuity provider could be
expected to reduce its risks by investing in assets weighted more toward fixed-
income assets than toward equities.126 By analogy to variable annuities, pro-
grammed withdrawals also would pose substantial risks in terms of ensuring
a steady stream of real annuity benefits.'" .
Mandatory annuitization is in tension with the view of personal accounts
as an accumulation of unrestricted personal wealth rather than an earmarked
source of retirement income." While some privatization proposals reject
annitization altogether,'2 9 others attempt to "shrink" the required level of
annuities to provide enhanced opportunities for bequests1 3 One such pro-
posal anticipates that the most "generous" option - allowing bequests equal
to the remaining actuarial value of a participant's personal account - would
reduce the overall level of annuities by approximately twenty-nine percent.3
Encouraging a higher level of bequests would seem sensible as a policy matter
only ifpersonal accounts are viewed essentially as simply another form oftax-
favored savings.3 2
125. See BoswoRTH&BuRisSs, supra note 11, at24-25.
126. See id. at 24 (noting that investment strategy of annuity provider implies that annu-
itants must accept "the riskless real rate of return" on their annuities).
127. See CONG. BUDGET OFCE, SOCIAL SECURITY PRIVATIZATION AND THE MANNUITIES
MARKET 25 (1998).
128. According to this view, mandatory annuitization would encourage unduly high levels
of consumption and penalize "thrifty" retirees who wish to preserve some portion of their
account balances to pass on to their heirs. See ADvIsoRY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 3, at
117 (statement of Joan T. Bok et al.); Diamond, supra note 69, at 45 (noting political issues
raised by contrasting views of "wealth entitlement" and "retirement income entitlement"); Kent
A. Smetters, ThinkingA boutSocialSecurity's TrustFund, in PROSPECTS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY
REFORM, supra note 9, at 214 (noting that some individuals may wish to use their account
balances to make gifts or bequests).
129. See ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 3, at 30 (discussing PSA plans).
130. See generally MARTIN FELDSTEIN & ELENA RANGUELOVA, THE ECONOMICS OF BE-
QUESTS IN PENSIONS AND SOCIAL SECURrY (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 7065, 1999).
131. See id.at3l.
132. Cf id. at 3 ("[The] same inability to do long-term saving can also justify helping
individuals to make the bequests that they would like to make but lack the ability to achieve.").
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I. Conclusion
Although any proposal to privatize all or part of the Social Security
system raises significant administrative issues, the implementation of personal
accounts does not appear to present insurmountable practical obstacles. It is
important, however, to understand that the federal government would un-
doubtedly play a substantial and continuing role, even in a privatized system.
Some functions, such as collecting contributions and transmitting them to
personal accounts, might readily be ceded to the government in the absence
of competition from the private sector. Other functions, however, such as
defining investment and withdrawal options and monitoring financial service
providers, are likely to prove more controversial. A move in the direction of
a privatized system would inevitably require a tradeoff between competing
goals. On the one hand, the principal rationale for personal accounts is to give
individual participants more control over their own funds and, as a corollary,
to remove those funds from the reach of the government. On the other hand,
any viable system of mandatory retirement saving must equip individual
participants to make responsible and informed investment decisions and must
also provide safeguards against fraud.
A centralized system modeled on the TSP could balance these goals by
offering participants a relatively narrow range of investment and withdrawal
options with correspondingly low administrative costs and limited risks.
Alternatively, a decentralized system could offer a broader range of options
coupled with higher costs and greater risks. Ultimately, the choice between
these approaches reflects controversial judgments about values and politics,
as does the broader debate over the direction of Social Security reform.'33
Some may perceive a centralized system as imposing unnecessary constraints
on individual choice and unacceptable risks of government interference in
private markets. Even proponents of a decentralized system with enhanced
individual choice, however, may find a basic low-cost plan desirable as a
default option. A two-tier system, combining a basic low-cost plan with more
flexible supplemental options, might balance competing goals while mitigat-
ing the need for intrusive government regulation. Even in a two-tier system,
however, it may be necessary to limit available options in order to protect
individual participants and to preserve the integrity of the system.
A system of personal accounts is often viewed as providing benefits not
available under the existing Social Security system. These benefits include
potentially higher returns, expanded investment choices, greater individual
equity, and long-run increases in national savings and productivity as a result
of switching from a pay-as-you-go system to an advance-funded system.
133. See Burke & McCouch, supra note 11, at 426.
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Whether these benefits can actually be achieved is likely to depend crucially
on details of structure and implementation. In designing a system of personal
accounts, it is imperative that the inevitable tradeoffs be carefully considered
at the outset and not left to be resolved at some indefinite fixture time. Only
when administrative issues have been squarely confronted will it be possible
to make a balanced assessment of the potential benefits relative to the risks
and costs of personal accounts.
